Nonviolent Struggle in Kosovo The current struggle being waged by Kosovars [eds. an ethnic minority in former Yugoslavia] has been chiefly nonviolent thus far since Kosovars have chosen not to use armed force for attaining their political objectives. Though cases of rioting by Kosovars has been reported by the Yugoslav media1, these do not appear to be part of a wider ranging struggle organised by Kosovars.2 The Kosovars' primary political objective during the period of nonviolent struggle falls into three phases. The first began with the effective suspension of Kosovo's police and judiciary in October 1987 and led to demands for the restoration of Kosovo's autonomy under the 1974 constitution. The second phase began with the dissolution of the Kosovo Provincial Assembly in July 1990 and saw the political objective become the recognition of Kosovo as a constituent republic within the Yugoslav Federation. The final phase began with the declarations of independence by the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia starting in June 1991 and led to the Kosovars' political objective changing to recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state. The nonviolent activity waged by Kosovars falls into three categories3. The first is nonviolent protest and persuasion which corresponds to the use of "largely symbolic actions intended to help persuade the opponent or someone else, or to express ... disapproval and dissent."4 The second is noncooperation and refers to the response of individuals, groups or societies to edicts imposed upon them which are viewed as unacceptable either as a result of the nature of the edicts themselves or by their promulgating authority.5 Nonviolent intervention is the third category and refers to acting in a manner which obstructs the functioning of the targets of a nonviolent campaign.6 There have been assorted activities held by Kosovars that fall into the category of nonviolent protest and persuasion. A mass rally of up to 100,000 was held in November 1988 to hear speeches for the reinstatement of two prominent Kosovars.7 On January 24, 1990 a crowd of up to 40,000 Kosovars assembled outside the Kosovo League of Communists headquarters and read out a list of demands.8 In September, 5,000 demonstrators gathered outside a hotel where US congressmen were to meet local leaders protesting at continued Serbian control of the province.9 On June 13, 1991 Kosovars organised a public protest in the form of a funeral procession for the symbolic "burial of the current violence." 10 As far as noncooperation is concerned, there have been diverse activities that fall into this category of nonviolent action in Kosovo. On February 4, 1989 a protest strike that had begun with miners developed into a general strike for the dismissal of pro-Serbian members of the Kosovo government.11 A general strike organised by the Independent Trade Union Organisation of Kosovo also brought Kosovo to a standstill in September 1990 with up to 200,000 workers participating.12 The general strike was preceded by a series of one-hour daily strikes that had begun in July.13 Various boycotts have also occurred in Kosovo. In July 1990, the Serbian referendum for a new constitution was boycotted by Kosovars and some 400 polling stations had not been opened by local authorities.14 This was followed by an overwhelming boycott by Kosovars of the December Presidential election (won by Slobodan Milosevic) held in Serbia.15 Schools were also boycotted on the first day of the new school year beginning in September 1990.16 This was followed a year later by 6,000 Kosovar teachers refusing to instruct the new Serbian curriculum.17 The final category of nonviolent activity, nonviolent intervention, has again seen an assortment of activities conducted by Kosovars. In February 1989, protesting the proposed amendments to the Serbian constitution and appointment of pro-Serbian members to the Kosovo government, 7,000 students from Pristina (the capital) began a sit-in at a sports stadium.18 The students' sit-in followed a sit-in by 1,500 miners over 1,000 metres below ground which had turned into a mass hunger strike.19 The hunger strike ended with the resignation of the politicians targetted by the strikers, and those remaining had to brought out on stretchers after 100 had already been hospitalised due to breathing problems and exhaustion.20 It is in the area of creating parallel political institutions in spite of continued political repression that Kosovars have been most successful in their nonviolent intervention. After its dissolution by the Serbian Assembly for rejecting the Serbian referendum for a new constitution and declaring Kosovo a constituent Yugoslav Republic in July 1990, the Kosovo Assembly was re-formed unilaterally by 111 of its ethnic Albanian, Turkish and Moslem deputies at a secret session in the Kosovar city of Kacanik on September 7.21 The Assembly subsequently declared an alternative constitution for the "Republic of Kosovo" as a full republic within Yugoslavia.22 Following the flight of many members of the Assembly to Zagreb, Croatia to escape prosecution for their declaration, an Assembly-in-Exile was formed. Despite Serbian insistence that its actions were illegal and attempts to thwart its activities, the Kosovo Assembly-in-exile organised a referendum on September 26-30, 1991 for the sovereignty of Kosovo. After a reported 87% turnout and 99.87% approval, a provisional coalition government was elected and headed by Bujar Bukoshi.23 The referendum was followed by elections on May 24 1992 (again declared illegal by Serbian authorities and boycotted by Serbs) in which the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) won a majority in the 130 member Assembly and declared its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, President of the "Republic of Kosovo." 24 Conclusion The range of nonviolent activities conducted by various individuals, groups and organisations and the support given to these by Kosovars, suggest that these activities are not isolated occurrences by a population largely content to live under rule by the Serbian state, but an organised and systematic expression of determined resistance to foreign rule. The grass roots level of organisation in the nonviolent activities suggest that they are not part of coordinated effort by external powers (viz. the Albanian state, the Austria or other international entitities)25 to weaken Serbia, but result from the efforts of prominent Kosovar trade unionists, cultural and political figures to protect Kosovo's autonomy and to promote self-determination. The efforts of the current Assembly-in-exile, then, should not be seen as part of a strategy of former Yugoslav republics to weaken Serbia, but part of the ongoing dynamics of the nonviolent struggle that is primarily grass roots and has continued in Kosovo since October 1987. The evidence suggests that the local and grassroots nature of the nonviolent struggle in Kosovo represents a recognition by the Albanian majority that they cannot achieve their political goals by a violent insurrection or rebellion against Serbian rule. It would therefore be tragic if the nonviolent struggle is allowed to be dragged into the wider military struggle currently occurring in other parts of the former Yugoslavia with all their horrific images of 'ethnic cleansing' and armed brutality. Such an event looked even more likely with the continuing influx of Serbian military and paramilitary forces into Kosovo and a mobilisation by the Albanian army on the borders of Kosovo and Montenegro in December 1992. The international community has to ensure that a political struggle which has remained, for the major part, explicitly nonviolent throughout its duration is not allowed to be dragged into a wider strategy for a military solution to the political problems that have arisen with the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation. To this end, the following four point plan should be observed with regard to the Kosovo nonviolent struggle and ensuring a nonviolent solution to its final political status. * place United Nations observers in Kosovo to ensure that a military solution is not imposed given the manifest will for a nonviolent solution by Kosovo's population; * end the political repression and control exercised by Serbia over all aspects of Kosovo's legal, political and cultural life; * ensure International and Serbian recognition of the Kosovo Assembly-in-exile as a legitimate representative for Kosovars and dialogue partner for deciding Kosovo's political status; * recognise Kosovo as an autonomous federal unit of the former Yugoslavia thereby including it in the European Community sponsored peacetalks aimed at resolving the political and military turmoil in the former Yugoslavia. Michael Salla Footnotes: 1. Keesing's Record of World Events (1989) p. 37173. 2. The objectivity of these reports can be questioned due to the dismissal and resignation of media figures for showing an 'anti-Serbian bias'. ibid. (1988) p. 35796. 3. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973) pp. 68-69 4. ibid., pp. 68-69. 5. cf., Sharp, op. cit., p. 183. Sharp refers to three subclasses that make up noncooperation: 'social noncooperation', 'economic noncooperation' and 'political noncooperation'. 6. ibid, p. 69. Sharp introduces five forms of 'nonviolent' or 'direct intervention': psychological; physical; social; economic; and political. 7. They were Kacusa Jasari and Azem Vlasi, Keesing's Record of World Events (1989), p. 36376. 8. Riot police used water cannon and tear gas to disperse the protest and made up to 100 arrests. ibid., p. 37173 9. Hours before the meeting took place, the demonstrators were dispersed by police using tear gas, batons and water cannon. ibid., p. 37726. 10. The organiser of the event, the leader of the Kosovo Parliamentary Party, Veton Suroi was subsequently sentenced to two months imprisonment. ibid. (1991) p. 38275. 11. After initially succeeding in forcing the resignation of the politicians in question, "special measures" were introduced with the arrival of further federal police and resignations. ibid. (1989) p. 36470. 12. In retaliation, Serbian authorities dismissed strikers from state-owned shops and jailed the president of the union, Hajrullah Gorani, for 60 days for publicly advocating the general strike. ibid. (1990) pp. 37725-26. 13. ibid., p. 37621. 14. ibid. 15. ibid., p. 37924. 16. This followed earlier boycotts organised in March 1989. ibid. (1990) p. 37725; (1989) p. 36514. 17. The teachers were threatened with dismissal and measures were passed limiting the number of Albanians in the education system. Meanwhile 350,000 Albanian pupils and parents were prevented from re-entering school because they had followed an Albanian curriculum. ibid. (1991) p. 38420-21. 18. ibid. (1989) p. 36470. 19. ibid. 20. ibid. 21. ibid. (1990) p. 37726. 22. The declaration was declared illegal by Serbian authorities and criminal charges were to be brought against the deputies. ibid., pp. 37621, 37726. 23. ibid. (1992) p. 38513. 24. ibid., p. 38919. 25. For an account of the external forces claimed to be behind the Kosovan resistance, see Markovic, Tragedy of National Conflicts in 'Real Socialism'' pp. 417-21. 26. James Pettifer, "Albania mobilises troops on the borders," The Australian (10 December 1992) p. 10.