Can They Save Albert Park? In early 1994, the Victorian government announced its intention to build a race track in Albert Park - one of Melbourne's premier parks and the site of Albert Park Lake - so that it could host an annual Formula One Grand Prix car race from 1996. Consistent with its record since it was elected in 1992, the government did not consult the community and local opposition to the proposal sprang up quickly. The major concerns in relation to the proposal include the unknown cost to the taxpayer, the destruction of the park itself, the adverse health and environmental impacts of the race, dislocation of the local community during the building and dismantling of the race infrastructure each year, the repressive legislation (designed to further stifle protest in Victoria) which will accompany it, and the narrow "tourist" orientation of the state government's economic development "strategy". In response to the announcement, concerned residents formed the Save Albert Park (SAP) group to conduct a campaign "to relocate the Grand Prix". The group organised a rally (which was attended by 10,000 people) in Albert Park on 15 May and, as evidence of its organisational effectiveness and commitment to conduct on ongoing campaign, opened an office on 10 June. It was during this period of intense activity - and with the paid-up membership numbering about a thousand - that I was invited to speak at an Executive meeting on 29 May so that I could outline the potential of a nonviolent action campaign. During this discussion, I made a point of identifying the variety of possible strategies - including a lobbying campaign or a legal challenge - which SAP could adopt. However, I was told that SAP had "already reached the point" where it believed that strategies such as lobbying and legal challenges were not going to be adequate and that a stronger form of political action was needed; this explained their invitation for me (rather than, say, a political lobbyist) to speak. On the basis of our discussion that day, the SAP Executive asked me to conduct a nonviolent strategy workshop so that key people could learn how to apply such a strategy. Given the apparent acceptance of the need for nonviolent action, I designed and conducted a workshop (on 11-12 June) which briefly introduced important concepts but which concentrated on providing the group with the opportunity to develop the outline of a "complete" strategy. I also introduced and encouraged the group to adopt inclusive group processes. Despite the fact that none of the workshop participants had any previous experience of nonviolent action campaigns (except as participants in the moratorium marches, for example), their demonstrated organisational abilities, their middle age and their professional backgrounds meant that all twelve participants appeared well-equipped to understand the strategic framework I introduced. However, as soon as the workshop finished (and despite my encouragement to organise follow-up meetings to elaborate some aspects of the strategy), most of the group got heavily involved in organising a second rally for 10 July. By the time this rally was over, the initial momentum to develop a "complete" strategy had been lost. Consequently, a strategy review workshop was held on 24 July in an attempt to regain the lost initiative. It was on this day that I started to more fully realise the serious nature of several problems within the SAP campaign. A subsequent meeting with the SAP Executive on 31 July and my attendance at a general meeting of members on 2 August confirmed my suspicions. While it is clear that the campaign always had (and still does have) an immensely difficult task ahead of it - particularly given the short timeframe - this task is being complicated by several factors. Here are some of them. Firstly, while the Executive is both talented and committed, it is guided by a policy-oriented (rather than structurally-oriented) analysis of the problem. Moreover, it has a single-minded commitment to halt the Grand Prix; it does not wish to fully consider the wider structural causes behind the decision or to use insights derived from this type of analysis to guide the organisation and implementation of its strategy. Careful listening to several members of the Executive has led me to realise that for most of the middle class professionals on it, the decision to build the Grand Prix in Albert Park is the first time that any of the major structures of patriarchy, capitalism or the state have consciously and adversely impacted on their lives in any significant way. Consequently, there is a tendency to regard the government's policy to build the track as simply a bad decision and to believe that high quality information exposing the problems associated with construction of the track will compel the government to change its mind. I now realise that my efforts during the workshop to help them to understand the structural factors and powerful vested interests which are behind this decision were manifestly inadequate: there is insufficient appreciation of the fact that it is power, profits and prestige - rather than information - which is at stake in this conflict. Secondly, it is clear that the commitment of SAP to a nonviolent action strategy is equivocal. This is evident from at least three sources: the reservations expressed by members of the Executive at the meeting I attended on 31 July about the commitment required for, and the consequences of, nonviolent action by the SAP constituency; the direction of the Executive that the "Nonviolent Action Working Group" change its name to the "Park Action Group"; and the failure to even mention the prospect of, and preparation for, nonviolent action during the reports to members at the general meeting on 2 August. This last omission was a marked contrast to the July meeting when I had been asked to talk about nonviolent action so that we could flush out any concerns. In fact, at that meeting, the only responses were positive. Nonviolent action to save the park was hailed by one older woman as "in the spirit of Gandhi". There are, of course, several reasons for this reaction against nonviolent action but a notable one is fear. As time passes - and the prospect of nonviolent action in the park becomes more imminent - people's legitimate concerns about such action (including fears of police violence, the threat posed by provocateurs, and the possible legal consequences) are beginning to surface more freely. Unfortunately, if predictably, this fear is now causing some people to question the nonviolent strategy itself; it is also impeding clear strategic thinking. (As an aside, it makes me question the wisdom of my decision to let SAP bypass the usual introductory workshop in favour of one oriented to strategy.) In any case, it is apparent that these fears within the Executive must be dealt with quickly and effectively so that a clear decision can be made about what strategy SAP will actually implement. As I have reminded SAP workshop participants several times, an effective nonviolent strategy requires that each of the twelve components of the strategic framework (which, of course, includes strategically oriented nonviolent tactics) is implemented. Thirdly, it is evident that SAP Executive members - understandably - are still very unclear about how nonviolent action actually works (is it merely 'symbolic'?) and how to implement the existing SAP strategy. This was made evident, for example, in the discussion about the role of the Nonviolent Action Working Group (NAG) at the meeting on 31 July and the decision to request NAG to write a report that was supposed to include information which, at this point, it is impossible to provide! As yet, members of this working group have not been given the opportunity to hear about, let alone understand, the SAP strategy, including its strategic goals. But even if they had, the working group cannot devise nonviolent tactics for use in the park (or anywhere else) without much clearer strategic guidance from the SAP strategy coordinating group, in whatever form this group finally takes. For example, and to identify one of the more obvious variables which should guide tactical selection, until it is clear whether nonviolent actions are intended to influence trade unions, corporate sponsors and/or the government, it is not possible to design strategically effective tactics. Given this knowledge, I had assisted the NAG to put basic processes in place - such as monitoring work in the park, initiating police liaison and preparing information/education programs. These processes were designed to prepare people for nonviolent action in whatever form it might turn out to be strategically appropriate to take (given the ongoing evolution of political circumstances and the strategic decisions this would require at the appropriate time). Fourthly, it is apparent that the organisation of SAP at Executive level is stifling growth of the campaign. At the strategy workshop, strategy review day and in private conversations, I have encouraged Executive members to "let go" of some of their control - even at the risk of lowering the "quality" of some aspects of the campaign - in order to provide space for other people to get involved. As I pointed out, it is clear from an analysis of community campaigns of this nature that any attempt to entrench a formal hierarchy within SAP would be highly dysfunctional. This was classically illustrated by the decision of the Executive to cancel three nonviolence information days organised by the NAG, at least until it "had more information". This decision was a serious error of political judgment on at least two counts. Firstly, it reflected a poor sense of the willingness of (at least some members of) the community to undertake some nonviolence education in order to prepare themselves to participate in politically effective nonviolent actions. And secondly, it revealed an inadequate appreciation of the critical importance of doing this as soon as possible if anything other than very simple actions (such as rallies) is to occur. This decision alone set an important aspect of the campaign back about a month and will seriously interfere with SAP's capacity to recruit, educate and organise people to participate in strategically focused, disciplined and effective action. Given their policy-oriented analysis and their familiarity with traditional forms of organisation, a meeting of the Executive on 15 August explicitly rejected my suggestions that the SAP campaign move to a non-hierarchical form of organisation and adopt "feminist" group processes on the grounds that these suggestions were unrelated to the purpose of saving Albert Park. (It was the identification of these unequivocal analytical and philosophical differences with the Executive which confirmed my inclination to discontinue my direct involvement in the campaign and I announced my withdrawal at that point.) In contrast to the Executive, the recently-formed NAG (a group of about twelve people from a diverse range of socio-economic backgrounds and a much wider age distribution than the Executive) had always accepted the inevitability of nonviolent action and, given their inexperience in organising campaigns of this nature, most members had readily accepted my suggestion that we use inclusive group processes. In any case, and to return to the original point, the decision to cancel the nonviolence information days reinforced the feeling held by some SAP members that the Executive is working to exclude people. At the meeting of the NAG following the Executive meeting which cancelled these days, most members of the group had strong feelings about the heavy-handedness of this decision ("a slap in the face" and "stalinist bureaucracy" were expressions which indicate the range of negative feelings). Within three weeks, when a range of concerns (about the campaign hierarchy, the class differences between the Executive and the NAG, the "Middle Park push" and the equivocal commitment of the Executive to nonviolent action) had not been satisfactorily resolved, four members of the NAG had resigned and at least one other was reconsidering their involvement. It should be noted that one of the Executive's concerns in relation to campaign organisation reflects the fact that members of the campaign have widely differing knowledge and skills and that some are "troublesome". However, given that the campaign needs many people working on it if it is to have a chance of succeeding, in my view, the challenge is to put more effort into helping people to find the most appropriate way to become involved even if this means there are mistakes made along the way. Membership of a working group, which is trusted to act in the best interests of the campaign, is one obvious way of doing this; there are many others. There are several lessons which may be derived from this brief analysis of the Save Albert Park campaign. These may be generalised as follows. 1. The strategy coordination group (SCG) of any campaign should consider (and preferably rely on) a structural (rather than simple policy) analysis of the problem. It should let insights derived from this type of analysis play an important part in guiding the organisation and implementation of its strategy. 2. The SCG should debate, at length if necessary, the nature of the strategy the group will adopt. It should also facilitate this debate among the membership. This debate needs to include an adequate process for people to deal with their fears. It needs to specifically consider whether the group actually wishes to adopt a nonviolent strategy which, of course, includes nonviolent action. If a campaign is to have any chance of success, this debate must end with a clear and full commitment to the strategy. 3. The SCG needs to provide clear strategic guidance to each of its working groups - based on the strategy developed during any strategy workshops - so that working group decisions can be made in the light of this. 4. The SCG should develop the organisational framework and processes to implement this strategy. Both for reasons of "democracy" (particularly in relation to encouraging participation) and because of the potential risks associated with any hierarchy (which makes an Executive particularly vulnerable to repression), groups of this nature should choose to use a non-hierarchical structure and to organise a systematic rotation of people onto and off the SCG. If a concerted effort is made to educate members about the strategy, it will be easier for more people to play a useful role in monitoring its implementation. Robert J. Burrowes