Blockading The Defence Centre On Monday 25 February 1991 there was a nonviolent blockade of the Defence Centre on St. Kilda Road in Melbourne. The action, organised by the Gulf Peace Team had the twin goals of highlighting the social/environmental costs of Australia's growing militarism and to nonviolently intervene in a small part of Australia's military role in the Middle East. The lead-up to the action, and the action itself was also designed to focus on ways in which people could withdraw their cooperation from Australia's military; namely war-tax resistance and conscientious objection. The Gulf Peace Team Melbourne Support Group is an affinity group of around ten to fifteen people that was formed initially to provide logistic and personal support for the eight Australian activists taking part in the international Peace Camp on the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. While providing this support for the eight activists, the Melbourne based support group also organised several nonviolent actions opposing Australia's role in the conflict and highlighting nonviolent resistance and solutions to the Persian Gulf War. These included; the water blockade of the H.M.A.S Westralia which was leaving for the Gulf, the laying of a 'protest wreath' at the Shrine of Remembrance, a week-long solidarity 'Peace Camp' in the centre of Melbourne, a civil-resistance action at Watsonia Barracks, a military base near Melbourne and supporting many other actions, vigils and rallies that took place during the fighting war. The idea for a nonviolent blockade of the Defence Centre grew from the recognition that the vast majority of activities organised within the Melbourne 'peace movement' were acts of 'protest and persuasion', that is, vigils, marches, rallies, public meetings, graffiti, street theatre and leafleting. All of which were important for their educative value and for empowering and involving people. Unfortunately, awareness of the importance and potential effectiveness of acts of non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention was not common among the numerous activists groups opposing the war. Because of the narrow range of nonviolent actions and the lack of clear strategic thinking the energy of the peace movement was directed straight up to the governmental level and primarily focused on a top level government decision to withdraw Australia's military commitment. Actions which encouraged people and groups to non-cooperate with (withdraw their support from) the machinery of war and actions which intervened in the military effort were only just being developed. The over-emphasis on 'protest and persuasion' type actions by the third and fourth week of the war was seemingly causing frustration among many activists who felt that simply marching or standing at a vigil was not reflecting their deep anger and emotions about what was happening in the Middle East. Many groups, particularly anarchist and student groups, were advocating more 'militant' type actions ranging from sabotage to 'taking up arms'. While these groups were attracting some adherents many more people simply stopped being involved in peace movement activities. Having gone to a rally or two, and written their letter to Mr. Hawke many people found there was little else for them that they could meaningfully do. Apart from the Gulf Peace Team, which was advocating war-tax resistance, and some rank and file union groups advocating strike action there was little support from the broad network of peace and political groups for 'non-cooperation' campaigns. The power and political effectiveness of the tens of thousands of people who attended the first two large rallies in Melbourne, proclaiming that they would refuse to pay 10% of their taxes this year or writing a letter to General Electric, (or any weapons manufacturer), informing them they would boycott all GEC products was simply not realised. Nor was the necessity to move beyond lobbying and acts of protest to actually intervening in Australia's war effort. The belief that the government's war policies could be changed by enough people 'showing their opposition' was widespread and virtually unchallenged. Frustration among activists increased as the numbers attending the many rallies and vigils, which had quickly become characterised by long speeches and endless megaphone-led sloganising, dropped rapidly. The 'more militant' groups, although more willing to experiment with creative actions, became characterised by slogan-shouting, flag-burning and on one occasion, smashing a window. Even though the merits of nonviolence were continually debated within most of these groups, the usual misconceptions of nonviolence being 'too passive' or 'too rigid and dogmatic' were predominant. There was a visible collision of information given by the traditional left and anarchist groups about how actions 'should be' and that given by nonviolent action groups such as the Gulf Peace Team. The main focus of debate was on the use of secrecy when designing actions and dealing with the police. There was a loose consensus among most groups that actions should not involve physical violence 'at this stage'. Over all, it was quite apparent that there was little understanding of the nature and extensive range of nonviolent tactics or of their political ramifications within both the mainstream and radical elements of the Melbourne 'peace movement'. The Gulf Peace Team Support Group spent three weeks carefully planning and organising a nonviolent blockade of the Defence Centre building. Reconnaissance of the building found it had approximately forty floors and housed over one thousand staff and military personnel, Logistics and Naval Command, Naval Supply and Weapons Development departments and established that an effective blockade would be very difficult. It had four entrances to the front of the building and two large car park entrances at the rear through which staff could be diverted if the front entrances were blockaded. The group decided after further reconnaissance that the best time to begin the blockade would be early morning, around 7.30am, before most staff had arrived. We decided that it would be better to blockade workers going in rather than going out. It was also decided that the blockade would continue until 5 o'clock that afternoon or until the blockaders are arrested. Once these details and the main aims and foci were agreed upon, advertising and liaison tasks were carried out. Advertising the action consisted of sending out a detailed 'Action Alert' to all fifty groups within the Network for Peace in the Middle East, distribution of a printed leaflet giving the details of the action and announcing it at various meetings and at a large rally a few days prior. Liaison for the action was extensive and thorough. Two activists contacted and visited the police officer that would be in charge of the operation and informed her exactly what we would be doing and why, giving her the opportunity to express both her concerns about the action and her sympathies with the cause. Liaison was also carried out with the Defence Centre Security and the Australian Protective Services officers at the Defence Centre itself. This liaison, which is often perceived as cooperation, was designed to break down the fear felt between police and activists and to continually encourage the individual police and security officers to express their views on the issue as a person outside of their normal 'role'. Liaison does give the police time to plan their response but the realisation that, whether they arrest us or not, our aims will be achieved and our message conveyed, soon puts them in a dilemma. Planning an action without the use of secrecy involves designing it in such a way that whatever the response of the police or opponents the aims of the action are achieved. Neither the police, security or building management were happy when hearing of our plans and spent the two weeks leading up to the action busily planning responses, liaising, notifying all the staff and most importantly thinking about what was going to happen. Although we were once offered the 'option' of not being arrested if we allowed staff through our blockade, not once did we compromise or 'negotiate' our plans. We found that the police and security officers that we were liaising with became quite exasperated when their normal 'roles' (obtaining information, containing demonstrations etc.) became unviable and even the final threat of arrest would not deter us. The open communication between the police, the building security and the activists gave us ample room to explain exactly why we were doing the action and demonstrate our sincerity and commitment. It also allowed us to freely advertise the action to other activists without concern for security and most importantly, enabled us to retain almost complete control of the issues and dynamics of the action. Also crucial was the liaison with the Defence Centre staff and military personnel. Although they would have been informed by the building administration we thought it was important to let them know our own perspective and that the action would be nonviolent and there would be no danger to person or property. Five days before the action we handed out five hundred leaflets outside the Defence Centre that outlined when and why we would be blockading them. It said in part: "Our purpose is not to condemn individuals but to challenge their values and perspectives. We ask staff and military personnel to support our action by wearing a white arm band to work on Monday and to think deeply about your own role in the Gulf War." Whilst leafleting there was a surprising amount of positive responses and interest and many lively conversations. Many military personnel were genuinely concerned about the war and Australia's involvement but also distrustful and skeptical about the 'peace movement' which they did not see as representing their interests. On the Sunday before the action there was a large meeting open for anybody wishing to take part in the blockade. At this meeting members of the Gulf Peace Team outlined the action plan and gave a legal briefing concerning arrest procedure and possible penalties. All activists discussed blockade techniques and responses to arrest and aggression and did a 'roleplay' of the blockade to test ideas. There was also a sharing of feelings and concerns about the action. Two staff from the Defence Centre attended the meeting and decided that they would take part in the action. At 6.30 the next morning about forty activists gathered outside the Defence Centre to discuss final details and inform new people of the action plan. After a media conference expressing our aims to the media, the activists broke into affinity groups responsible for blockading different entrances with several people acting as 'runners' to communicate between them. By 7.30am all the front entrances were successfully blockaded by groups of people standing and sitting in front of them. It soon became apparent, however, that the staff, as they were arriving, were being diverted to the rear, car park entrances. As the activists now numbered about sixty, it was quickly decided to send two affinity groups around to each of the car park entrances. These were blockaded by a line of activists standing with arms linked and facing the staff as they were arriving. Within half an hour of the blockade starting, every entrance to the building had been successfully blocked. Some military personnel tried to physically get through the blockade, pushing the activists apart or squeezing between. This led to some scuffles which the media quickly focused on. Some staff arriving in cars pushed slowly through the line of activists who remained linked until forced apart by the car. Whenever the line was broken the activists quickly linked up again. The first response of the police and security when it became obvious that the blockade was effective was to attempt to physically force the activists apart to allow staff to walk through. This was soon overcome by more activists simply linking up in the opening. During the entire blockade, despite being handled roughly by both police and military staff (some activists received bruises on their arms from being gripped) there was no physical violence or verbal abuse offered by any of the activists. Instead, there was open dialogue and often intense conversations between the blockaders and the people arriving for work. Every effort was made to communicate to the workers and to the police why we were taking this action and our feelings about the war, and also to listen to them. This communication was helped by the distinctive lack of chanting and megaphones! Rather than chants, music and singing provided the background for the conflict that was being enacted. It was obvious that the police were leaving arrests as their last option. After the complete blockade had been in place for about twenty minutes and the numbers of waiting staff and military were in their hundreds, the police issued arrest warnings, (giving ten minutes to leave the area) and arrests began. Thirty-one people who had refused to move from the two car park blockades were arrested and taken by police van to a nearby station where they were charged with obstruction. One of those arrested was a worker at the Defence Centre. The activists left at the Defence Centre agreed that the blockade had ended and went to support those arrested at the station. A condition of bail had been set by the officers in charge of the operation which, if signed, would have prevented any of the activists from entering any Commonwealth Defence property until the court hearing in June. The bail condition was dropped, however, when almost all of the activists informed the police that they would refuse to sign it and remain in gaol. The blockade involved activists with different levels of experience, with diverse political views, from many different groups and an age range from eighteen to eighty. All seemed to work together well, learning from and supporting each other. The main feeling about the action was that it was challenging and empowering. As an experiment in nonviolent action it was an example of how activists can carefully and deliberately generate conflict and involve every person in that conflict. Although it intervened in Australia's war effort only minimally, the blockade successfully challenged the values, perspectives and assumptions of every person who came in contact with it, affecting every employee and military staff in the Defence Centre. This factor is fundamental to the mechanism of change inherent within nonviolent action in which shifts of loyalty and the invisible undermining of the power of the opponent often operate more quickly than dramatic 'stunts' which might only be possible through secrecy. Had the momentum of the 'peace movement' continued after the US- Iraqi war (and the media attention) finished, the action, as part of a developing grassroots strategy, could have led toward encouraging and supporting mass noncooperation, systematically 'exposing' the institutions of war and changing the human values and assumptions upon which those institutions are based. It is clear that the primary fault of the blockade was its isolation from a continuing campaign that could follow and build on initial actions such as this. Most groups, including the Gulf Peace Team, found it difficult to maintain energy levels and focus after the main 'issue' of the war was declared over. War is a manufactured end-product of the exclusive, competitive, fear-based politics that most people in our society are used to. While confronting and resisting the horror and obscenity of war by blockading the Defence Centre in Melbourne we were also exploring the creative, cooperative and inclusive politics of nonviolence. Anthony Kelly