Satyagraha in a City of Steel

Hunter Valley Rainforest Action Group (HVRAG) was convened at a public
meeting in Newcastle in June 1991.  At the first meeting, the people who
eventually became the core, shared their reasons for becoming involved.  To
put my position in perspective now, I stated then that I wished to assist in
the empowerment of new social change activists, and offer nonviolence as a
mode of operation.  Eventually, HVRAG chose to explore nonviolence as our
informing political philosophy.  The aim of this RAG (Rainforest Action
Group) was to raise the rainforest timber issue in the Hunter Valley.

It soon became obvious that this was not going to be as easy as in other
places where RAGs operated.  There were no rainforest timber ships, or
rainforest timber importing businesses.  Our early research indicated that
every timber supplier stocked rainforest timber, and many carpenters
preferred it to the alternatives.  There were no easy targets, so we began
education work.

I conducted a nonviolence workshop for HVRAG in early September that included
a session on applying NV strategy, based on guidelines and tools from MNS's
(Movement for a New Society).  "Resource Manual for a Living Revolution".  I
compiled the results into a strategy for the group which has been outlined in
a previous NVT article (NVT No. 24).  At the time of formulating this
workshop, I had just read "The Conquest of Violence" by Bondurant, and
emphasised the differences between Satyagraha and regular NV techniques  in
the theory discussions.  Satyagraha appeared to me to be focused on
persuasion as method, acceptance of self suffering as test of belief in one's
relative truth, and the need for a constructive programme.  The group
concurred that it would be of value to try and hold to these.  HVRAG's slogan
reflected these decisions : "Help Protect Rainforests, Choose Plantation
Timber".  The aim of the campaign became : "Minimise the Consumption of
Rainforest Timbers".

The Hunter Valley rainforest timber trade has two components, the consumers
and the timber retailers.  We targeted our education campaign (strongly
urging plantation alternatives) at builders, carpenters, architects and
draftspeople.  Meanwhile the retailers would be approached to get their
cooperation with the campaign.  Those retailers who chose not to cooperate
with the campaign would be potential targets for NV direct actions.

The rainforest timber trade is driven by a strong market demand.  Given our
preference to persuade retailers to cooperate, statements such as "Ban
Rainforest Timbers" were not appropriate. Our first contact with the
seventeen suppliers in Newcastle and Maitland was a letter that described the
issue as we saw it, our campaign, and invited cooperation through any of
three actions : 
1. Display information on the alternatives to rainforest timber.
2. Stock alternatives
3. Do not sell rainforest timber
Managers were informed that they would be contacted for their responses, and
that a register of those cooperating would be sent to all builders,
carpenters, architects and draughtspeople.

Our time frame was set from October until Christmas.  The letters to managers
were sent on October 24.  The last seven weeks of the strategy were going to
be busy, with negotiations, preparation for NvA and NvA.  Alas, the Dili
massacre occurred and AIDEX happened.  The divergence of personal energies
within the group took its toll on our effectiveness.  All HVRAG activists,
most of them new, were involved in all three campaigns.

Two weeks after the letter the first personal contact was made with
retailers.  The response surprised us, with at least five positive
receptions.  Further contact throughout November resulted in half of the
retailers cooperating.  As all retailers stocked alternatives, and none were
prepared to withdraw from the rainforest timber trade, cooperation came down
to putting up a poster identifying rainforest timber and advising
alternatives.  Negotiations with managers centred on the agreement that there
is a strong market for rainforest timber and the change first needed to occur
in consumer demand.  From this common ground it was easy to come around to
displaying the poster to assist consumer education.

It was interesting that most of the businesses that chose to display the
poster were small and independent, and most of those that didn't were outlets
for large multi-national companies.  In the later cases, managers generally
resorted to the company policy of not putting posters up for anyone, although
some referred to a higher level in their decision-making hierarchy.

Also worth noting was the strength of the register of retailers who had
become supporters of the campaign as a sanction.  Managers were uneasy about
being omitted, given that they stocked alternatives, and that put us in a bit
of a quandary regarding selection criteria for the register.

By December we had identified those retailers that would cooperate.  We chose
a target from the others.  Our tactic for NvA was to invade their premises
and post the bill on the rainforest timber.  Before the invasion, direct
negotiations with the manager began.  On our first two approaches we had not
been invited to speak to the head manager.  However, once we had decided on
direct action and informed our original contact we were immediately invited
to talk to the head manager.  This first round of direct negotiation over the
phone very nearly achieved a settlement, until the manager inquired about the
sort of actions we thought we would take.  He was told and then cancelled all
deals and invited the conflict.

Raising the level of conflict through direct action was always part of our
strategy to make the building industry take note of our campaign.  This
invitation caused us to seriously rethink our chosen tactic.  We realised
that the action had potential to become a disempowering force.  The worst
scenario would be for our small group to be totally ignored, allowed to put
up our posters and then leave.  And that situation would do little by way of
persuasion.  The media and police had already been informed of our planned
action.  We decided a new plan was in order, and settled on a vigil with
leafletting of potential customers outside the premises to last all day. 
After a debate about what constituted openness, we did not advise the
retailers of our new plan.  This was for two reasons, our new plan was a
reaction to their reaction to our first plan, and who could say what their
reaction to the new plan would be?  We might all be in jail.  The second
reason was that we did not want to inform the retailer what we thought was
the best response to thwart the first plan.

The action went ahead at 10 a.m. December 23rd.  We mustered fifteen
activists and supporters.  A delegation was sent in to attempt a final effort
to persuade the retailer to cooperate.  Only one reporter was on hand and no
police.  It looked very much like we might just be totally ignored.  The
delegation was invited into the manager's office and the reporter came in as
well.  We were informed that the manager had sent the police away.  He said
he was not afraid of us and we could protest all week if we liked.  It turned
out later that media did not attend because of ineffectual communication: the
importance of personal links was impressed upon us.

Thus began negotiation proper.  The manager was quite excited and spent much
of the first half hour alternatively abusing us personally, berating our
amateurish campaign or focussing on our mistakes.  There were serious
inaccuracies in some of our published material and the poster.  Indeed,
humility was the order of the moment.  The manager informed the reporter that
his industry association contacts had warned him to be careful of us because
we would be acting on instruction from bases in Melbourne or Sydney.  The
reporter asked us about the inaccuracies.  We admitted they existed.  He
invited us to get in touch with him later and left.  Suddenly the manager
became far more personable.

The essential difference in our relative truths was finally uncovered.  The
manager believed that the rainforest timber he stocked had been sustainably
logged in the Philippines.  We informed the manager that a study for the
international tropical timber association had identified less than one
percent of all rainforest logging operations as sustainable, and that minute
proportion being in Queensland.  We agreed to disagree on this fundamental
point and proceeded to the merits of our campaign.

Again it was easy to reach agreement that consumer education should be the
beginning of change.  What had we done other than threaten him with foolish
direct actions, he wanted to know?  We told him we had done market stalls for
three months, displays to the region public and high school libraries, two
public film nights and mail-outs to all builders, carpenters, architects and
draughtspeople.  What more do you want a small volunteer community group to
do in six months? we asked.  Why didn't we go to the industry from the start,
he asks us?  The members of the delegation looked at each other dumbfounded. 
Here we were experimenting with Satyagraha, trying to persuade rather than
coerce, and what?  Our entire strategy was riddled with our society's us-them
mentality.

We could have avoided all the errors, the manager tells us.  He could have
had his staff whip up a better poster in ten minutes (that poster had been a
hard job for us).  We could have got it accepted through the local industry
association, he tells us.  We shuffle our feet, humbled.  The manager says
though, that yes, he remembers one of his regular customers hassling him
about rainforest timber a couple of months ago.  He couldn't make sense of it
then.  We quickly bring the discussion back to the issue.  We do have a
campaign and we do want him to put up a poster.  He will not put up our
poster with its inaccuracies.  He will either design one himself or put up an
industry designed one.  He wants it known though, that he is not afraid of
us, and after two and a half hours, settlement is reached.  He will put up a
poster (no time frame) with two conditions: We give him a list of other
suppliers cooperating (three hundred and fifty registers had gone in the mail
that day) and we do not claim victory in the media!

This member of the delegation was elated.  Outside, half the supporters had
left and the rest were sitting in the shade - not a particularly exciting
action for them.  

Our report back contained a vital observation.  Throughout the meeting the
manager was visibly shaking.  Certainly I doubt it was fear, but the emotions
aroused by the HVRAG mobilising on this issue had the manager's adrenalin
pumping.  Fifteen people had arrived and were prepared to do direct action
and he had to respond.  Would we claim victory in the media?  The group
agreed not - we were all relieved and stuffed.  We headed home to celebrate.

The lessons I learned
The most obvious one is to avoid the us-them cynicism of our society when
planning a strategy.  The moment we canvassed the idea of involving retailers
in our campaign, we should have paid them the respect of telling them, indeed
inviting their input.  We couldn't have lost, we had no luck getting anyone
else involved.  I learned much about negotiating.  Mostly that negotiation
does not occur in a power vacuum.  Not until we had exhibited our ability to
apply sanctions did we achieve serious negotiations.  The value of agreeing
with your 'potential ally' should they make a valid point was vital.

Although not discussed so far, I relearned that group process is like
surfing.  If not practised regularly, when one plunges back into the fray,
one's timing is out, awareness of surrounds not quite what it should be, but
above all, complacency will lead to unsound balance and eventual wipeouts,
with all the potential hazards therewith associated.

Two weeks after Christmas, most HVRAG activists had decided to move onto
other campaigns, empowered.
James Langley