Nonviolent Activism and Police

There is an ongoing debate in activist circles concerning the appropriate
nature of the relationship between activists and the police.  According to
some activists, the police are violent agents of the state who may be
verbally abused, physically resisted (particularly during arrest) and, if
circumstances allow it, personally assaulted.  For these activists, acting in
any other way towards the police or telling them about a proposed action is
tantamount to 'cooperation with the enemy'.

Of course, an activist's attitudes and behaviours towards the police are not
determined in isolation; they are part of a wider social cosmology.  Put
simply, an activist's attitudes and behaviours towards the police depend on
their conception of society, their understanding of the causes of conflict
and how it is resolved, and their beliefs about activism and what it is
supposed to achieve.  For example, if an activist believes that virtually all
conflict is driven by class divisions in society and that the aim of engaging
in conflict is to destroy the members and agents of the 'ruling class', then
it is easy to consider the police (who are controlled by the state which
serves the ruling class) to be 'class enemies'.  According to this
conception, there is no distinction between the responsibility of actors and
the responsibility of structures; conflict is essentially about winning or
losing and the purpose of activism in this sense - whether it is violent or
even pragmatically nonviolent - is to defeat the opponent actors and to
secure control of the structure.

In contrast, if you believe - as I do - that conflict in society is built
into social structures (including patriarchy, capitalism and the state which
generate conflict along gender, class, race and other lines) and not into
people, then a distinction must be made between structures and actors.  Of
course, the structures are perpetuated by people who perform particular roles
within them but, according to this view, the evil is in the structure rather
than the person who carries out their duty.  According to this conception,
conflict is a shared problem and the opponent is a partner in the struggle to
find a mutually satisfactory outcome.  And the aim of nonviolent activism is
to preserve the person while systematically destroying the evil structure.1 
One reason for this, according to Gandhi, is that humans are related by a
bond that is deeper and more profound than the bonds of social relationship:
we are all part of the unity of life.

So what are the implications of this for the relationship between nonviolent
activists and the police?  At its most fundamental, it highlights the
importance of activists engaging in debate about the nature of the strategy
they will adopt - including the conception of nonviolence (essentially
'principled' or 'pragmatic') which will guide it.  Without this debate, the
strategy is unlikely to be focused or effective.  The principal reason for
this is that nonviolence, in the Gandhian sense, is disciplined and
rule-based.  Too often, as Michael Nagler has pointed out, people try a kind
of nonviolence which is unsystematic: they may have the best of intentions
but their nonviolence is of the 'make-it-up-as-you-go-along' variety.  This
is grossly inadequate: Nonviolence has precise rules for success and they
must be learned and applied.2  By engaging in debate about the merits of
different strategies, as well as their requirements for success, activists
are more likely to develop a cohesive and comprehensive strategy as well as
the commitment necessary to carry it out.

According to this argument then, the nature of activist relations with the
police is an important strategic question which should be guided by the
principles of nonviolence that underpin the strategy as a whole.  Moreover,
the historical evidence demonstrates that a pragmatic conception of
nonviolence (which may, for example, utilise a win-lose approach to conflict
and endorse the use of secrecy to improve the chances of a tactical
'success') is grossly inferior as a philosophical basis for
strategically-oriented nonviolence.  This is because it is implicitly based
on conceptions of society and conflict which ignore vital insights about the
nature of human behaviour; for example, that people have an innate need to
participate in the conflict resolution process if they are to accept its
outcome. While it is obvious that not every activist debate about the
conception of nonviolence that will be used to guide strategy will end with
an agreement to use principled nonviolence, it would be good if those debates
which did not end in this way had a clearer sense of the costs of their
decision.

In strategic terms, the value of liaising honestly with individual police is
that it may undermine the support of one structure of power readily available
to the opponent: the police force.  A vital aspect of dismantling any
structure of power is to create circumstances in which the people within it
are disinclined (or refuse) to perform their role (and, of course, people
with whom you have an honest personal relationship are less likely to want to
arrest - or assault - you).  This is effective politics because it undermines
the power of those who control the structure.  In the case of the Melbourne
Rainforest Action Group during 1989-1990, activist- police dialogue and the
consistently disciplined and nonviolent behaviour of the activists led to
considerable cooperation between activists and police over the rainforest
issue - which is not to suggest that RAG members were naive about the
capacity of the police to use violence if they choose (and which was most
recently demonstrated in Victoria during the violent removal of a blockade at
Richmond Secondary College on 13 December 1993).

Police Liaison
Once it has been decided to liaise with the police, it is important to plan
the meeting as thoroughly as possible.  Who will represent the activist
group?  Will the group initiate contact by telephone, letter or a personal
visit?  What should the liaison group do before, during and after the action?
Here are some thoughts.

Firstly, plan exactly what you want to tell the police.  (If necessary, the
meeting with the police can be roleplayed within the group.)  In my case,
this always includes the precise details of the action and a brief
explanation of why I or the group is doing the action.  Answer questions
honestly; for example, if you do not know exactly how many people are coming
to the action, say so but give your best estimate.  If the police ask why
your group is doing this particular action, explain the reasons without
submerging them in detail about the issue (unless it is clear that they want
to hear it).  I have a simple rule: if someone hasn't asked me a question,
they are not ready to hear my answer.  In any case, the major goal of this
dialogue is to encourage the people who wear police uniforms for a few hours
of their day to understand the important personal elements of your campaign. 
If you have the chance, tell them how you feel about the issue rather than
what you think.

Secondly, listen carefully to and acknowledge police concerns (whether they
be about police safety, activist safety, breaking the law or disagreement
with your issue/tactics).  Once you have clearly indicated that you have
heard them (by restating their concerns if necessary), reiterate that because
of your commitment to the cause, your group feels compelled to proceed
anyway.  Stress that the action will be nonviolent and that no police will be
abused or hurt.  This will reduce their fear and may, as their trust of you
builds, increase their willingness to cooperate on some aspects of future
actions.

Thirdly, if necessary, and to demonstrate your willingness to accommodate
legitimate police concerns, negotiate minor changes to the details of the
action.  For example, if you are holding a rally (rather than conducting a
blockade) and they are concerned about its location for what seems like a
good reason (safety, obstructing flow of people/vehicles), then have the
authority from your group to negotiate a slight change of venue. Of course,
if you are planning a blockade, the location may not be a negotiable detail. 
The point about this item is simple: indicate your willingness to negotiate
on non-essentials (as part of your willingness to cooperate where possible)
but be clear about not conceding on important points of principle or tactics.
Of course, if the police do not like what you are going to do, they have the
option of arresting you and you can remind them that this is a price you are
willing to pay in order to demonstrate your commitment to your cause.

Fourthly, if there are any changes to the action, advise the police in
advance.  Fifthly, liaise with the police on the day of action.  Sixthly, do
everything you can to make certain that the action goes precisely as you have
planned.  This may require roleplays beforehand, action leaflets - which list
the group agreements and describe the action - handed out to activists as
they arrive, and peacekeeping teams (to deal with undisciplined people or
provocateurs).  If the preparation is thorough and the discipline of the
activists virtually certain, a peacekeeping leaflet (as distinct from an
action leaflet) may be circulated instead.  Here is a sample.

Today's Nonviolent Action
The Melbourne Rainforest Action Group (RAG) has spent several months planning
today's action.

We have organised a disciplined, creative, nonviolent action, which
highlights our concern about global rainforest destruction, rainforest
logging in Sarawak and the plight of indigenous peoples.

Please demonstrate your solidarity with our cause by displaying respect for
the ship's crew, the police, Port officers, waterside workers, the media and
each other.

Thankyou,
The RAG Peacekeeping Team

Finally, liaise with the police afterwards to share lessons for the future. 
If it gets to the stage where they agree with your cause and trust your group
to act the way you say, they may be willing to help you.  Of course, this may
never happen.  In any case, it is not your job to organise actions just so
that the police are happy with them (for example, so that they do not have to
carry out arrests because they think it makes them 'look bad').  If the
police refuse to perform their duty (for example, if they find reasons not to
arrest you), then you have reduced the power of multinational corporations
and the state to carry out policies that you do not like.  And undermining
the support of structures of power is what nonviolent action is all about.

Alternatively, you may reach a point - as is now happening in several
countries in some contexts - where you cannot get arrested!  In these
circumstances, police detain, remove and release.  This may be done, among
other reasons, so that activists are denied the opportunity to express
themselves in court (at which some are very effective).  If this starts to
happen, you may decide to change tactics (for example, to agree, as part of
your action, to keep re-entering a prohibited area until the police are
compelled to arrest you).

Before concluding, it should be acknowledged that, even with complete honesty
both before and during an action and even with complete nonviolent discipline
on the part of the activists, there can never be any guarantee that police
will not injure activists.  Thus, while activists need to understand that
truth and nonviolent discipline are essential ingredients in the effort to
minimise the risk to their personal safety, they also need to understand that
it is their willingness to suffer for what they believe that gives their
action its moral authority and its power to cause change.

Secret actions and the police
One issue that confounds many activists is whether or how to liaise with the
police when the group wants to do a secret action.  In my view, the answer is
simple: do not plan secret actions.  For many reasons, as the historical
record illustrates, secrecy seriously undermines a nonviolent action
campaign.  Briefly, it is inconsistent with telling the truth and showing
respect for the opponent, it undermines the effort to build trust, it
exacerbates the fears of opponents and police, it suggests cowardice rather
than courage, and it creates the impression that activists are trying to
escape the consequences of their actions.

While the rejection of secrecy eliminates certain types of action, it opens
up the possibility of using a more powerful conception of nonviolence.  But
if activists are to be fully persuaded that secrecy is counterproductive, it
is important that they understand why nonviolence actually works.

In brief, nonviolent action works because it favourably alters the social and
political climate, the physical circumstances and the human psychological
conditions (both innate and learned) characteristic of conflict.  One way in
which it does this is by eliminating uncertainty about activist behaviour.
Secrecy, of course, subverts this process.  But rather than elaborate these
elements of the argument here, I will briefly illustrate one insight derived
from them: secrecy is strategically unnecessary.

When planning a nonviolent action, it is important to decide the goal of the
action and to then organise the action in a way which is designed to achieve
that goal.  A well planned action should be strategically effective but this
does not mean that it must be technically successful.  For many types of
action - such as a rally, a picket or a strike - no one would even suggest
using secrecy.  And, in these cases, the strategic effectiveness of the
action derives largely from its 'technical success' which, in turn, may
depend on a certain amount of publicity.

But for some types of action, strategic effectiveness is unrelated to whether
the action is successful in the technical sense or not.  For example, the
goal of 'blockading' a rainforest timber ship is not to stop it physically -
although if there were sufficient activists available to do so, this would be
a tactical option.  The goal of a river 'blockade' (chosen partly because of
its rich symbolism) is to undermine political support for rainforest
destruction.  One way in which a decline in this support may be expressed is
through a change in consumer behaviour: people may stop buying rainforest
timber.  This change is achieved because people are inspired by the honesty,
discipline, integrity, courage and determination of the activists - despite
arrests, beatings or imprisonment - and are thus inclined to identify with
them.  Moreover, as an extension of this, they are inclined to act in
solidarity.

This point was classically illustrated by the Indian satyagrahis who
attempted to nonviolently invade the Dharasana salt works in 1930.  Despite
repeated attempts by many hundreds of activists to walk into the salt works
during a three week period, not one activist got a pinch of salt!  But an
account of the activists' nonviolent discipline, commitment and courage -
under the baton blows of the police - was reported in 1,350 newspapers around
the world. As a result, this action - which technically 'failed' -
functionally undermined support for British imperialism in India.3  If the
activists had resorted to the use of secrecy, there would have been no chance
to demonstrate their honesty, integrity and determination - and to thus
inspire empathy for their cause - although they might have got some salt!4

Whether or not activists are technically successful in doing what they set
out to do is often (but not always) strategically irrelevant.  It is the
nature of how they attempt it - and how they deal with the consequences -
that is really important. 
Robert J Burrowes

References
1. For a discussion of the Gandhian position on this point, see Johan
Galtung. The Way is the Goal: Gandhi Today. Ahmedabad: Gujarat Vidyapith
Peace Research Centre, 1992. pp. 57-58.
2. M.N. Nagler. 'Nonviolence as New Science' in V.K. Kool. (ed). Perspectives
on Nonviolence. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990. p. 138.
3. For an account of the salt raids at Dharasana, see Thomas Weber. '"The
Marchers Simply Walked Forward Until Struck Down": Nonviolent Suffering and
Conversion'. Peace and Change. 18, 3, July 1993. pp. 267-289.
4. If salt had been removed secretly, the British government could, if they
had chosen, ignored it (after all, who would have known or cared?). However,
they could not afford to let the satyagrahis take salt openly because salt
removal was illegal and failure to react would have shown the salt law - a
law which represented the antithesis of Indian independence - to be
ineffective.