Nonviolence as a Discursive Struggle In the last issue of Nonviolence Today (#38 May/June 1994) Robert Burrowes presented a convincing case for pursuing nonviolence as a way of life. I would like to suggest here that in addition to practices at this crucial personal level, the role of nonviolence must also be considered as part of what could be called a discursive struggle. It is of utmost importance to examine how dominant societal opinions judge the morality, usefulness, and applicability of violence and nonviolence respectively. These issues are more than just exercises in abstract theorizing, they are of seminal practical importance to activists and provide valuable guidelines about how to fight oppression and how to work towards a more just and nonviolent society. I will try to illustrate this claim by presenting Michel Foucault's concept of discourse in a langauge that is, hopefully, accessible to readers who do not have a philosophical background. In one of his early lectures at the College de France, the French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault presented discourses or discursive practices as mechanisms that set the boundaries to our thought processes. In any society, no matter how democratic, there is always a process of exclusion going on. Some ideas prevail over others. Some actions are considered legitimate and moral, some not. Although for us the boundaries between them seems objective, they are in fact arbitrary and in constant flux. It is the existing dominant discourse, the most widely accepted way of looking at the world, that decides through what lenses we look at the environment that surrounds us. Why is such an insight important to the study and practice of nonviolent resistance? Dominant discourses not only influence the way we look at the world, they also construct it. Practices of domination and patterns of conflict are not immutable facts of life. They are the outcome of specific historical struggles. Our world is shaped by the way we look at it. Much of the power that is contained in violence is derived from the fact that today's dominant discourse draws a direct link between power and violence. Power, as understood by most policy makers and commentators, is a negative concept, something that emanates from a government's control over the means of violence and coercion. Power is, according to this view, not vested in the people, it is contained in such institution as the army, the police, or the state in general. Foucault vehemently disagrees. He sees power not as a repressive element, he sees power as an enabling force, a potential opportunity to improve the position of disadvantaged people. Power is not just limited to force, it operates at all societal levels. Maybe most importantly, power is not a predetermined and fixed thing, it is what the dominant discourse defines it to be. This is, of course, not to say that coercion has no real effects. But all violence can do is kill, injure, or displace people. Any additional effect of violence is dependent upon either the continuous application of violence or the credibility of the threat that it produced. Thus, with regard to power relationships, the more enduring consequences of violence are not its immediate effects, but the fear that they produce. The same could be said of nonviolence. Its power depends largely upon people being aware of the potential that social noncooperation contains. If people in a repressive society accept that they are powerless against the overwhelming state apparatus, then change from below is not likely to happen. If, by contrast, the population realizes that the power to rule is dependent upon the obedience of the population, then various possibilities for fighting repression could arise. Recent successful examples of such challenges include the manifestation of 'people power' in the Philippines (1986), successful student resistance to military regimes in South Korea (1987) and Thailand (1992), or the velvet revolutions against authoritarian Communism in East-Central Europe (1989). What kind of consequences does a devoted nonviolent activist draw from these observations? There are several crucial implications. Acknowledging the importance of discourses entails that besides nurturing the inner virtues of nonviolence, as Robert Burrowes correctly advocates, one needs to pay equal attention to the external awareness of these virtues. It is not enough if a few devoted activists are aware of the power of nonviolence. In order to have an influence on the dominant discourse and its forging of reality, activists must try to increase public awareness about what nonviolence can and cannot do. Opening up thinking space within the dominant discourse is, of course, not an easy task. Established societal systems and the discourses that maintain them contain an in-built mechanism of self-preservation. Because dominant discourses helped to establish the existing 'reality', alternatives to them seem often to be unreasonable, Utopian. Established regimes always try to preempt or eliminate threats to the status quo, be they of a practical or a discursive nature. It is thus not surprising that throughout most historical periods, statesmen, politicians, writers, and dominant societal discourses in general stressed the duty to obey far more than the possibilities that could arise out of disobeying. It is not surprising that those who resisted existing practices and promulgated the power of nonviolence were systematically excluded from mainstream society. The most prominent among these seminal yet marginalized authors include Etienne de la Boetie, Henry David Thoreau, Mohandas Gandhi and Gene Sharp. Hence, if we are to unfold the full potential of nonviolence, we need to continuously challenge the privileged position of the dominant discourse. Only through the continuous creation of thinking space can we eventually move towards forms of social justice that are less exclusionary than the present ones. Only though a continuous challenge of prevailing perceptions of power can such forms of nonviolent protest as civil disobedience or sit-ins contribute to fighting domination and improving the position of marginalized societal groups. Only if we continuously resist submission to prevalent social practices can nonviolent forms of conflict resolution take over the task that coercion and violence are fulfilling now. It is the responsibility of each of us who is concerned with nonviolence to engage with the dominant discourse and the way it links power with violence. It is up to us to convince the people around us that nonviolence is more than just a superior moral position. We need to draw attention to the transformative power that it contains and to the ways through which this power can be unleashed. This is one of the reasons why a publication like Nonviolence Today is of great importance, not just as a forum for exchanging ideas among activists, but also as an instrument to influence the general public. Roland Bleiker